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Abstract. We have evolved an IT system that is ubiquitous and pervasive and integrated 
into most aspects of our lives. Many of us are working on 4th and 5th level refinements in 
efficiency and functionality.  But, we stand on the shoulders of those who came before and 
this restricts our freedom of action.  The prior work has left us with an ecosystem which is 
the living embodiment of our state-of-the-art.  While we work on integration, refinement, 
broader application and efficiency, the results must move seamlessly into the ecosystem.  
Fundamental concepts are being researched in the lab and may rebuild the world we all live 
in, until that happens, we must work within the ecosystem. 
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1 Introduction 
Today, a combination of standards, applications, methodologies and interfaces has 
evolved into an ecosystem call web 2.0.  Although the name would indicate a new 
version of the World Wide Web, it does not refer to any technical specification, but 
rather to the way software developers and end-users use the web today [1].  O'Reilly 
Media publisher Dale Dougherty coined the phrase Web 2.0 In 2004 [2].  Searching 
the web will not provide a clear definition of web 2.0.  The author takes the term as a 
maturity level of processes, standards, and applications that form an ecosystem around 
which other applications and processes cannot diverge significantly or there cost to 
adopt them will be excessive. 
 
2 The Layers of an Ecosystem 
The ecosystem is a living, breathing embodiment of an IT system of systems that is 
ubiquitous and pervasive and integrated into most aspects of our lives.  It adapts to 
environment changes and enforces a measure of conformance by its very existence. 
2.1 Ecosystem Layers 
Describing an architecture that conforms to these concepts requires specific 
elements and standards, a partial sampling is given in references [3] – [7] to ensure 
  
the processes are built into systems.  The layers are similar to the layers in an onion as 
shown if figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  The Layers of the Ecosystem 
2.2 Layers within layers 
The layers of figure 1 are exemplary and have not been blessed by any 
organization.  Certain of the sub-layers have.  In figure 1 we have broken out the sub-
layers of one category – communications – and apply the open systems interconnect 
reference model [8] for its constituent sub-layers shown below in figure 2.  The model 
has been used for the definition of end points and protocols for communications 
processes. 
 
Fig. 2. Secure Communication OSI Reference Model  
  
3 Working within the Layers 
Wherever you work in this ecosystem, you must be concerned with: 
Functionality- A Manet must provide routing of messages to members of its 
network. 
Efficiency – A pheromone based routing method must be more efficient than a 
priority-based or round-robin routing to make it worth the added 
complexity. 
Security – Even in ad-hoc Manet based networks we must protect our own assets 
and monitor nefarious behaviors.  The following are some threat mitigation 
and elimination that may be considered:  
a. Traditional threats  
i. Threats against the OS and Network interfaces  
ii. Authentication, Authorization attacks 
iii. Man in the middle attacks inside / outside enterprise both 
on the platform and  on all comm. Links 
iv. Configuration setup and Change based attacks,  
v. Mobile software attacks 
vi. Integrity Attacks [change security attributes, metadata 
record content] 
vii. Design and Implementation threats 
1. Buffer overflow, Static Analysis, Type checking 
2. Web service attacks [cross site scripting, ]  others 
3. Threats on Caches, Replays 
 
  
 
b. Data at rest and data in Motion threats 
c. Cryptographic key  PKI  private key  and session key threats  [Java] 
d. Attacks on Virtualization  [Minimal] 
e. Attack on  Inter Forest / Enclave Trust,  TPM  and  Others   … 
f. Threats from Black Hat 
Integrity – software, data, credentials all need to be validated as to source and 
tamper resistance. 
Standard Interfaces – unless we are in a standalone environment we must be able to 
communicate with other elements in the ecosystem. 
Records Management – Record pertinent events for monitoring and forensics: 
a. Security violation 
b. Performance issues 
c. Fault recoveries 
d. Health Monitoring 
e. Behavioral Monitoring 
f. Others dealing with the functionality 
g. Etc. 
If you are not working in all of these areas, your work may not survive the laboratory. 
4 Vulnerabilities in Software 
Vulnerabilities occur at all levels of software development.  Most of the software 
developed for wireless communication are coded to the middle of the OSI 
communications model.  Vulnerabilities are tracked and aggregated according to the 
software level, and the weaknesses in coding by the Common Weakness Enumeration 
(CWE) [9] which describes itself as follows:. 
“CWE - International in scope and free for public use, CWE 
provides a unified, measurable set of software weaknesses that is 
enabling more effective discussion, description, selection, and use 
of software security tools and services that can find these 
weaknesses in source code and operational systems as well as better 
understanding and management of software weaknesses related to 
architecture and design.” 
 A summary by type is provided below as derived from the CWE for middleware 
coding vulnerabilities. The broader category includes a broad range of middleware 
software including Oracle data base code and Apache HTTP server code, but can be 
used as a gauge for software vulnerabilities that arise during normal coding, using 
standard coding reviews.  You could expect the numbers to be considerably higher for 
software developed within academic experiments and experimental code with less 
stringent development activities. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Weakness Enumerations 
Common Weakness Enumeration for Non-Website Vulnerabilities 
1 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer (CWE-
119) – 32% 
2 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (CWE-94) – 17%  
3 Resource Management Errors (CWE-399) – 10% 
4 Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) – 9% 
5 Numeric Errors (CWE-189) – 8% 
Middleware Coding Vulnerability Types 
1 Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) – 11% 
2 Resource Management Errors (CWE-399) – 11% 
3 Improper Control of Generation of Code (‘Code Injection’) (CWE-94) – 9% 
4 Numeric Errors (CWE-189) – 9% 
5 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer (CWE-
119) – 7% 
8 Summary 
This paper has reviewed the eco-system that most research will eventually have to 
live within.  The ultimate goal is to have the algorithms coded into products and 
deployed into an enterprise or web service environment.  Shortly after your research 
phase and as you begin product development remember these factors. At whatever 
layer you are working, you are responsible for; Functionality, Efficiency, Security, 
Integrity, Standard Interfaces, Records Management(for forensics), Etc.  Shortfalls 
will have to be covered in the next level in the ecosystem, often at a penalty in 
performance and efficiency.  These items should be “baked in” not “added on”.  
Eliminate Common vulnerabilities.  Your algorithm (no matter how efficient) may not 
become productized or institutionalized if you miss these factors. 
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